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[1]  It is a commonplace to speak of the application of law to facts.  
Application is a practical art, and thus involves method.  Curiously, there 
is a paucity of discussion of the various methods by which substantive 
legal standards are applied to facts.  This omission is significant.  Method 
is not outcome-determinative in all cases, but, at a minimum, it guides 
analysis, opening certain possibilities and foreclosing others. 
 
[2]  The latest example of the jurisprudential lack of attention to method is 
the body of briefing surrounding, and commentary spawned by, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.1  Trinko, and three decisions by United 
                                               
*  James E. Scheuermann and William D. Semins are attorneys in the Pittsburgh office of 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP, where they litigate on behalf of and 
counsel clients concerning antitrust matters.  This article reflects the authors’ views on 
important antitrust issues, but does not necessarily reflect their views as to the resolution 
of these issues.  Moreover, the article does not necessarily reflect the view of any client 
of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP or of the firm itself. 
1 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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States Courts of Appeal,2 have inspired a host of briefs amicus curiae and 
substantial commentary on the issue of the standard for liability under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.3  Despite the attention lavished on Trinko’s 
discussion of the substantive standard that should govern section 2 cases, 
and despite the relatively few high court decisions addressing the 
application of the antitrust laws to regulated markets, the method by which 
Trinko applies section 2 to a deregulating market has received no 
attention.  This omission is noteworthy.  In Trinko, the Supreme Court 
adopted a novel method for applying the antitrust laws in regulated and 
deregulating markets that could have profound implications for 
participants and litigants in those markets, and not only because it adds a 
new layer of uncertainty to business conduct and planning by, and antitrust 




[3]  The regulatory statute at the heart of Trinko is the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Act”).4  The Act opened the retail 
market for local telephone service to competition by, inter alia, 
compelling incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”), who had 
previously enjoyed a legally sanctioned monopoly, to interconnect their 
                                               
2 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2932 (2004); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 
2003). 
3 Trinko alone generated more than twenty amicus briefs, including a brief filed jointly on 
behalf of the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Department of Justice, 
2003 WL 21269559 (May 23, 2003).  The Supreme Court has invited the Solicitor 
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States regarding the issues at 
stake in 3M Co. v. LePage’s Inc., 540 U.S. 807 (2003), for which at least five amicus 
briefs had been filed as of July 2003, representing the interests of more than twenty 
different organizations.  Commentary includes numerous articles, see, e.g., Eleanor M. 
Fox, The Trouble with Trinko (Antitrust Section, ABA), Apr. 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/communication/ troublewithtrinkodoc; a 
roundtable discussion in W. Dennis Cross, What’s Up With Section 2?, 18 ANTITRUST 8 
(2003), and an ABA-sponsored teleseminar on the Trinko decision, entitled “When You 
Don’t Know What To Do, Walk Fast and Look Worried (Dilbert 2003):  Hitting the 
Section 2 ‘Refresh’ Button for In-House Counsel Following Trinko” (Feb. 26, 2004), 
reprinted in THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (July 2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust /source/Jul04-Teleconf7=23.pdf. 
4 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2000). 
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network facilities and equipment, which would include providing access to 
operations support systems, with those of any requesting rival local 
exchange carrier (“LEC”), and to do so at wholesale, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory rates.5    
[4]  In Trinko, the plaintiff’s claim emerged from a dispute between a 
predecessor of Verizon Communications, Inc. (“Verizon”), an ILEC, and 
AT&T, a new competitor in the local exchange market.6  This dispute led 
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and the New York 
Public Service Commission (“PSC”) to investigate whether Verizon was 
meeting its interconnection obligations under the Telecommunications 
Act.7  The investigations resulted in a $10 million finding of liability by 
the PSC and a consent decree between Verizon and the FCC.8  Subsequent 
to the consent decree, the Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 
(“Trinko”), which purchased local telephone service from AT&T, brought 
a consumer class action against Verizon on behalf of all customers of 
Verizon’s competitors since 1996.9
 
[5]  Trinko alleged that Verizon, the incumbent carrier, denied AT&T’s 
customers equal access to its local network in violation of the anti-
discrimination and interconnection requirements of the Act.10  In 
particular, Trinko alleged that Verizon violated the affirmative duties of 
cooperation imposed by the Act, by failing to fill orders of its competitors’ 
customers, failing to inform its competitors of the status of their 
customers’ orders, and generally failing to provide its competitors with 
adequate access to its operations support systems.11  Trinko also alleged 
direct harm in the form of poor phone service, and that the deficiencies in 
Verizon’s assistance to AT&T amounted to monopolistic conduct in 
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.12   
 
[6]  The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that Trinko lacked 
standing and the complaint did not state a cause of action for which relief 
                                               
5 See id. §§ 251(a), (b), and (c) (2000). 
6 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403. 
7 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(c)(2)-(3); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403. 
8 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403-04. 
9 Id. at 404. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 404-05. 
12 Id. at 405. 
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could be granted.13  The district court held, inter alia, that Trinko did not 
have an antitrust claim because Trinko’s allegations were inextricably 
intertwined with the Act and that, even if such allegations were not 
inextricably intertwined, the Act must take precedence over the general 
antitrust laws when the two regulate precisely the same area.14  On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and 
reinstated the section 2 claim without addressing the merits.15  The 
Supreme Court granted Verizon’s petition for certiorari and issued a 
unanimous decision to reverse the judgment, with a six-Justice majority 
opinion that addressed the antitrust implications of the affirmative duties 
to cooperate established by the Act.16    
 
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE:  PRESERVING V. EXPANDING  
TRADITIONAL SECTION 2 LIABILITY 
 
[7]  The Trinko Court’s majority opinion frames the issue as “whether the 
allegations of [Trinko’s] complaint fit within existing exceptions” to the 
doctrine that section 2 does not restrict the right of a monopolist to refuse 
to deal with a competitor “or provide a basis, under traditional antitrust 
principles, for recognizing a new one.”17  On no less than ten occasions in 
its sixteen page slip opinion, the Court further articulates the issue as a 
choice between “preserving” and applying “traditional antitrust 
principles,” “established antitrust standards,” “existing antitrust 
standards,” and “pre-existing antitrust standards,” on the one hand, and 
“an expansion” of section 2 principles, on the other.18  These pre-existing 
antitrust standards include a version of the rule enunciated in United States 
v. Colgate & Co.,19 that the Sherman Act “‘does not restrict the long 
recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to 
                                               
13 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
14 See generally id. 
15 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 107-10 (2d 
Cir. 2002).  
16 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 404-16.  The three concurring Justices would have reversed the 
Second Circuit on grounds of lack of standing.  See id. at 416-18. 
17 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. 
18 See, e.g., id. at 404-11. 
19 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
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parties with whom he will deal,’”20 and the exception to this rule 
recognized in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp,21  which 
held that in certain circumstances, a monopolist’s refusal to cooperate with 
rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate section 2.22   
 
[8]  This seemingly innocent framing of the issue is laden with a host of 
unarticulated jurisprudential assumptions.  These assumptions are 
foreshadowed in the Trinko Court’s discussion of the Act’s antitrust 
savings clause, which provides that “‘nothing in this Act or the 
amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or 
supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.’”23  The Trinko 
Court properly states that this clause precludes a finding of implied 
antitrust immunity and preserves claims that satisfy “established antitrust 
standards.”24  The Court goes further, however, and also reads the antitrust 
savings clause as creating the following limitation:  by virtue of the clause, 
the Act “does not create new claims that go beyond existing antitrust 
standards.”25  It is one thing to recognize that the Act does not trump the 
Sherman Act and is not an independent source of antitrust liability.  That 
is unassailable.  Yet it requires several logical or interpretive leaps to 
suggest, as the Court does here, that the antitrust savings clause means that 
application of traditional antitrust principles to the Act’s unique regulatory 
scheme precludes a finding that conduct that did not violate antitrust law 
prior to the Act can violate antitrust law after the passage of the Act.  In 
other words, the Court suggests that context does not or may not alter 
outcomes.26  Indeed, this reading of the antitrust savings clause is contrary 
                                               
20 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 
(1919)).  To be precise, the Court quoted Colgate only in part.  See id.  The Court omitted 
the introductory phrase, “In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly 
. . .”  See id.  The Court also failed to note that Colgate articulated the rule in the context 
of a purely vertical distribution relationship.  See id. 
21 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
22 Id. at 601. 
23 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
406 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152, note (2000)). 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 For another example of this leap in logic, see, e.g., Covad Communications Co. v. Bell 
Atlantic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131 (2002) (interpreting the antitrust savings clause 
to mean that “conduct that did not violate antitrust law prior to the 1996 Act does not 
now violate antitrust law after the Act.”). 
 5
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue1 
to numerous cases that recognize what we shall refer to here as the 
“Guiding Principle” for analyzing antitrust liability and remedies in 
regulated industries: the analysis must be context sensitive.   
 
[9]  The Court, in its opinion, twice pays homage to the Guiding 
Principle.27  First, at the beginning of section 2, the Court recognizes that 
“[t]o decide this case, we must first determine what effect (if any) the 
1996 Act has upon the application of traditional antitrust principles.”28  
Again, at the beginning of section 4, “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be 
attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at 
issue . . . . ‘antitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the 
distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it 
applies.’”29  Yet, when the Court considers whether Trinko fits into the 
Aspen Skiing exception (in section 3), it almost entirely ignores the 
“distinctive economic and legal setting” created by the Act.30  The Court’s 
only real consideration of substantive antitrust implications of the Act 
occurs in its analysis (in section 4), of whether Trinko merits an 
“expansion” of section 2 liability by the judicial creation of another 
exception to the Colgate rule.31  For reasons never articulated, but which 
presumably have their genesis in the Court’s “preserving” vs. “expanding” 
framework and the corollary reading of the antitrust savings clause, the 
Court applies the “traditional” exception to the Colgate rule articulated in 
Aspen Skiing as if the Act did not exist or is irrelevant. 
 
[10]  Before considering the details of the Trinko Court’s methodology 
and its implications, it is useful to place it in context.  Following the 
Guiding Principle, the typical line of inquiry in a regulatory antitrust case 
is, what area of voluntary, unregulated decision making or area of 
competition, if any, exists notwithstanding the regulatory scheme, and has 
the defendant allegedly or actually committed an antitrust violation in that  
                                               
27 See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
28 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405. 
29 Id. at 411-12 (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston Edison, Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.)); accord, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI 
Communications, 748 F.2d 799, 1105-06 (7th Cir. 1984).   
30 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-11. 
31 See id. at 411-15. 
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unregulated, competitive market?32  The question assumes that, with 
respect to the regulated conduct, the regulatory scheme implicitly or 
expressly creates an antitrust immunity, or allows the defendant to avail 
itself of one or more other antitrust defenses, such as the “state action” or 
“filed rate” doctrines.33  Painting with a broad, yet accurate, brush, courts 
typically have answered this question by following one of two methods: 
the Otter Tail method or the Town of Concord method.34
 
[11]  The Otter Tail method is characterized principally by an analysis of 
the applicable antitrust standard and the inquiry into whether the plaintiff 
has alleged or proven the required elements, or whether the defendant has 
asserted a viable defense, under that standard.35  Once the regulatory 
scheme has been analyzed to address the immunity question, the 
regulatory scheme generally assumes a secondary, but important, role in 
the antitrust liability and remedies analysis, by causing the courts to 
“‘adjust their usual rules to the existence, extent, and nature of 
regulation.’”36   
 
                                               
32 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (explaining 
that when “voluntary commercial relationships . . . are governed in the first instance by 
business judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant to . . . override the 
fundamental national policies embodied in the antitrust laws.”); American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 708 F.2d at 1103 (“The mere pervasiveness of a regulatory scheme does not 
immunize an industry from antitrust liability for conduct that is voluntarily initiated.”) 
(citing Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 374). 
33 The Court notes in Trinko that “a detailed regulatory scheme such as that created by the 
Act ordinarily raises the question whether the regulated entities are not shielded from 
antitrust scrutiny altogether by the doctrine of implied immunity,” but recognizes that the 
savings clause bars this inquiry in this case.  Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406.  See PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 200-231 (2d ed. 2000) 
(discussing the relation between antitrust, federal regulation, and express and implied 
immunities). 
34 Undoubtedly, the generality of these two methods overlooks many nuances and details.  
Nonetheless, it is useful for our limited purpose of analyzing the regulatory methodology 
of the Trinko decision. 
35 See generally Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372-82 (1973). 
36 American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d at 1106.  With respect to issues of monopoly in 
particular, “the presence of a substantial degree of regulation, although not sufficient to 
confer antitrust immunity, may affect both the shape of ‘monopoly power’ and the 
precise dimensions of the ‘willful acquisition or maintenance’ of that power.”  Id. (citing 
Keith S. Watson & Thomas W. Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated “Monopolies”:  
The Search for Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 563 (1977)). 
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[12]  Thus, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,37 the Supreme Court 
considered whether a regulated electric utility violated section 2 by 
refusing to sell electricity at wholesale and refusing to “wheel” (transmit) 
power to municipal power companies who competed with it in the retail 
distribution market.38  The Court disposed of the immunity defense by 
finding that the regulatory scheme in question created an area of 
competition in which commercial relationships are “governed in the first 
instance by business judgment and not regulatory coercion.”39  The Court 
then undertook an extended analysis of the application of section 2, and 
held that “Otter Tail used its monopoly power . . . to foreclose competition 
or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation 
of the antitrust laws.”40  The Court considered and rejected the 
defendant’s various defenses.41  Specifically, the Court accepted both the 
factual finding that there were no technical factors that prevented Otter 
Tail from selling power wholesale or wheeling power and the finding that 
Otter Tail’s conduct had no legitimate business purpose, and rejected the 
defendant’s Noerr-Pennington defense,42 along with the defendant’s 
arguments that its willingness to wheel power to other customers relieved 
it of its duty to wheel or sell power to competing municipalities, and that if 
Otter Tail assisted its retail competitors, it would “go downhill.”43  The 
Court also considered the implications of the regulatory scheme in its 
discussion of the appropriate remedy.44   
 
[13]  Similarly, in United States v. Marine Bancorporation,45 a 
government challenge to the merger of two commercial banks under 
section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court’s legal analysis began by 
discussing an essential element of a section 7 violation: the determination 
of the relevant product and geographic markets.46  Following that 
discussion, the Court engaged in an extended analysis of the potential 
                                               
37 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
38 See id. at 373. 
39 Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 374. 
40 Id. at 377 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).   
41 See generally Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372-82. 
42 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 201b – 201c. 
43 Id. at 378-80. 
44 Id. at 381-82. 
45 418 U.S. 602 (1974).  
46 Apparently no immunity issue was raised on appeal, and thus does not figure in the 
opinion. 
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competition doctrine in the context of the “extensive federal and state 
regulation of banks, particularly the legal restraints on entry unique to this 
line of commerce.”47  Based on this highly context-sensitive analysis, the 
Court rejected the government’s merger challenge.48   
 
[14]  Issues of antitrust standing, and specifically, antitrust injury analyses 
that focus on whether the parties are competitors and whether there has 
been injury to competition, tend to follow the Otter Tail method.  Thus, 
for example, in the seminal case applying the antitrust laws to deregulating 
electric utility markets, City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co.,49 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether 
two fully regulated electric utilities conspired to eliminate competition in a 
geographic area when, after announcing their planned merger, one of the 
utilities withdrew its application to the regulatory body for a change in its 
certificate of service which, if granted, would have allowed it to compete 
with the other defendant-utility in that area.50  The Court held that because 
the deregulated, competitive market was merely on the horizon and the 
market was still subject to a “comprehensive regulatory framework” 
prohibiting retail competition between the two defendant utilities, the 
plaintiff suffered no antitrust injury as a result of the utilities’ alleged 
conspiracy and plan to merge.51  In the absence of competition, plaintiff’s 
injury “did not flow from the defendants’ conduct, but, rather, from the 
realities of the regulated environment in which all three were actors.”52  
The Court noted that if the case had come to it after the deregulatory 
scheme was in place, and if the two utilities were in fact competitors, its 
antitrust injury analysis would have been “radically different.”53    
                                               
47 Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 606, 641. 
48 Id. at 641.   
49 147 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 1998). 
50 Id. at 261-62. 
51 Id. at 263. 
52 Id. at 265. 
53 Id. at 269.  For additional cases adopting the Otter Tail Method, see, e.g., United States 
v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355-72 (1963) (bank merger challenge under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic 
Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 107-13 (2d Cir. 2002), rev’d, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Covad 
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated by, 
124 S. Ct. 1143 (2004), and rev’d in part, 347 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004) (refusal to deal, 
essential facilities, and price squeeze claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act); 
Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 
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[15]  In contrast, under the Town of Concord method, once the regulatory 
scheme has been analyzed to address the immunity issue, the inquiry 
proceeds in two steps.54  First, it asks whether the type of claim at issue, 
considered outside of the regulatory context, is viable under relevant 
antitrust principles and policies, including what may generally be referred 
to as administrative or institutional constraints, such as clarity and 
predictability requirements.T55  Second, it asks whether the regulatory 
context of the type of claim at issue should lead to an abandonment or 
modification of the conclusion reached in the first part of the analysis, or 
whether that context confirms the conclusion. 56  
 
[16]  Thus, in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.,T57 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, speaking through then-Judge 
Breyer, examined on appeal, after a full trial and jury verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff, the question of whether an alleged price squeeze by a fully 
integrated electric utility violates the antitrust laws when it occurs in a 
fully regulated industry.58  The court proceeded by (1) considering the 
“ordinary price squeeze” in an unregulated industry, (2) comparing the 
“ordinary price squeeze” to the “regulatory” price squeeze, and then (3) 
“noting that regulation makes a critical difference in terms of antitrust 
harms, benefits, and administrative considerations.”59  The court’s 
analysis of the “ordinary price squeeze” in general, and not with specific 
reference to the facts of this case, concludes that the antitrust harms and 
pro-competitive benefits of a price squeeze in an unregulated environment 
are “closely balanced.”60  The court’s equally general, non-case specific 
analysis of price squeezes in regulated industries begins with a statement 
of the standard to be applied (a balancing test in which the challenged 
                                                                                                                    
1997) (finding no antitrust injury); Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. 
Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1996) (territorial allocation scheme under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 
1105-53 (1983) (various violations of section 2; “consideration of federal and state 
regulation may be proper [in the antitrust analysis] even after the issue of antitrust 
immunity has been resolved.” Id. at 1105). 
54 See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
55 See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (emphasis added). 
56 See id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
57 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 
58 Id. at 18. 
59 Id. at 23. 
60 Id. at 25. 
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practice’s “likely anticompetitive effects” are balanced against “its 
potentially legitimate business justifications”61), takes note of the antitrust 
injury requirement, and then stresses as “particularly important” the 
administrative considerations of the need for “clear” and “administratively 
workable” antitrust rules.62   
 
[17]  Rather than analyze the elements of plaintiff’s alleged section 2 
violation and the defendant’s asserted defenses, or the evidence actually 
presented at trial, the regulatory price squeeze discussion focuses on “the 
likelihood of major antitrust harm,” the “likelihood of ‘entry barrier’ 
harm” in a regulated context,63 and whether regulation makes “it less 
likely that a price squeeze” will drive out competitors.64  The court, in 
refusing to hold that a regulatory price squeeze violates section 2, relies 
heavily on “institutional reasons” that may harm consumer welfare and 
“chill” and “discourage” legitimate price competition and the 
“administrative difficulties” in having judges and juries embark upon rate 
regulation.65  Finally, the court defers to administrative remedies as more 
efficient and appropriate tools for correcting a poor cost-allocation scheme 
or rate schedule.66  Thus, the court concludes that a price squeeze in a 
fully regulated industry “will not normally” violate section 2,67 but may do 
so in cases involving “exceptional circumstances.”68  The court states, “in 
light of the regulatory rules, constraints, and practices, the price squeeze at 
issue here is not ordinarily exclusionary, and for that reason, it does not 
violate [section 2 of] the Sherman Act.”69  The court does not consider 
whether the case at bar involves any “exceptional circumstances.”70  
Rather, it proceeds in homage to the Otter Tail method by analyzing the 
                                               
61 Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. at 21-22. 
63 Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at 26-27. 
66 Id. at 28. 
67 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. at 29.   
69 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
70 See id. at 29 (“Even so, we have limited our holding by stating that "normally" a price 
squeeze will not constitute an exclusionary practice in the context of a fully regulated 
monopoly, thereby leaving cases involving exceptional circumstances for another day.”). 
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relevant market and finding that the defendant did not have market power, 
and thus did not prove an essential element of a section 2 violation.71
[18]  Trinko distinguishes itself because its analytical method does not 
follow either the Otter Tail or Town of Concord methods.  The two-part 
structure of the Court’s analysis echoes the Town of Concord method, and 
yet the first part of that analysis -- that is, whether the case fits into 
existing refusal-to-deal precedents, specifically, Aspen Skiing -- is very 
different from that of the Town of Concord method because it abandons 
the generality of that method.  Moreover, its framing of the two-part 
method as an analysis of “traditional” vs. “expanded” antitrust principles 
is foreign to the Town of Concord method.   
 
IV. ELEVATING THE FACTS OF ASPEN SKIING  
TO SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 
 
[19]  Consistent with the first part of the Town of Concord method, in 
analyzing whether the facts alleged by Trinko fit within the Aspen Skiing 
exception to the general right of a monopolist to refuse to deal, the Court 
ignores almost entirely the regulatory landscape created by the Act.  In 
addition, the Court assumes that the inquiry addressing whether Trinko fits 
into existing antitrust principles requires that the case be analyzed as if it 
were a refusal-to-deal case arising in a non-regulated market.  Finding that 
Trinko could not sustain his section 2 claim in the unadorned hypothetical 
market in which the Act does not exist, the Court holds that “[t]he refusal 
to deal alleged in the present case does not fit within the limited exception 
recognized in Aspen Skiing.”72  Trinko, however, cuts a new path in its 
                                               
71 Id. at 29-32.  We are aware of no cases that clearly follow the Town of Concord 
method.  Arguably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit followed 
this Method in broad outline in Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., where the court first 
considered whether the affirmative duties to assist one’s rivals imposed by the Act exist 
“under the unadorned antitrust laws,” and found that they do not, and then analyzed the 
“elaborate enforcement structure” under the Act and concluded that the antitrust laws 
“would add nothing to the oversight already available under” the Act.  222 F.3d 390, 400 
(7th Cir. 2000).  Verizon’s brief to the Court in Trinko urged the Court to adopt the Town 
of Concord “analytical framework” and cited Goldwasser and Cavalier Telephone LLC v. 
Verizon Virginia, Inc., 330 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2003), as examples of this “framework.”  
See Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
v. Trinko, 2003 WL 21244083 (U.S. 2003) (No. 02-682). 
72 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 
(2004). 
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“ordinary” or “unregulated” market analysis by abandoning the generality 
of the first part of the Town of Concord method -- that is, the antitrust 
analysis of this type of claim generally in an unregulated market -- and 
asks instead whether Trinko is factually on point with existing refusal-to-
deal precedent as embodied in one case, namely, Aspen Skiing.73
 
[20]  According to the Trinko Court, a principal criterion for liability in 
Aspen Skiing was the defendant’s unilateral termination of a voluntary 
cooperative venture.74  The Court reasons that “[t]he unilateral termination 
of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing 
suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits solely to achieve 
[the] anticompetitive end” of driving a competitor from the market.75  By 
contrast, in Trinko, the complaint did not allege that Verizon participated 
in a voluntary cooperative scheme with its rivals, or would have done so 
absent statutory compulsion.76  The Trinko Court finds this distinction 
significant insofar as the lack of a prior cooperative scheme between 
Trinko’s supplier, AT&T, and Verizon “sheds no light upon the 
motivation of its refusal to deal -- upon whether its regulatory lapses were 
prompted not by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice.”77   
 
[21]  This analysis is cryptic, at best.  Presumably, the Court is not 
attempting to resurrect subjective intent as an element of a section 2  
monopolization violation, since it recognizes earlier in the opinion that 
anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct is at the heart of a section 2 
monopolization violation, not subjective intent.78  Moreover, in Aspen 
                                               
73 See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
74 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
75 Id. (emphasis in the original). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 407.  Thus, Aspen Skiing teaches that, for purposes of a section 2 monopolization 
cause of action, “[e]vidence of intent is merely relevant [not essential] to the question 
whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as ‘exclusionary’ or 
‘anticompetitive’….”  Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602; accord, e.g., United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that monopolization 
analysis is concerned with “the effect of [the challenged] conduct, not upon the intent 
behind it” and that the monopolist’s subjective intent “is relevant only to the extent it 
helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist’s conduct”).  But see, e.g., Covad 
Communications, 299 F.3d at 1283-84 (“An assessment of intent is critical in determining 
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Skiing, the Court recognized that evidence of intent need not be direct.79  
Intent may be inferred from conduct because “no monopolist monopolizes 
unconscious of what he is doing.”80  Thus, in Aspen Skiing, because the 
defendant unilaterally terminated its participation in a profitable 
cooperative venture and could not explain how its conduct made economic 
sense apart from harming competition, the Court concluded that the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant engaged in “willful” 
monopolization when the defendant sacrificed short-term profits for long-
term monopoly gain.81  Perhaps, then, the Court’s implicit point is that 
without a prior voluntary cooperative scheme between the parties, the 
inference to anticompetitive or exclusionary intent from conduct is 
impossible or impracticable.  In other words, without a prior voluntary 
scheme, there is no baseline for or no standard of economically efficient 
conduct, which if deviated from by the defendant, allows the inference of 
anticompetitive intent.  Yet this cannot be right, or if it is, it requires 
argument to show it, and the court offers none.82  It can very reasonably 
be argued that the statutory requirements of cooperation under the Act 
occupy the same analytic role as the voluntary cooperation in Aspen 
Skiing; that is, both set the standard for presumptively economically 
efficient conduct, deviations from which, without a legitimate business 
justification, may constitute a section 2 violation.83   
 
[22]  The Court also found a “more fundamental” difference between 
Trinko and Aspen Skiing, namely, that84 in Aspen Skiing, the defendant 
refused to provide its competitor with a product that it already sold at 
retail, whereas in Trinko, the product (i.e., the unbundled elements offered 
pursuant to section 251(c)(3) of the Act) was offered under statutory 
compulsion at wholesale to competitors, not consumers.85  These 
distinctions may be principled and material, but the Court’s opinion does 
                                                                                                                    
whether an accused monopolist’s actions qualify as anti-competitive conduct.”), vacated 
by 540 U.S. 1147, remanded to 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004). 
79 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 603 n.28. 
80 Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., Inc., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 
1945)); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.   
81 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S at 608, 610. 
82 See generally Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585.  
83 See infra Part VI. 
84 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
85 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410. 
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not explain why.86  In addition, the retail/wholesale distinction drawn by 
the Court is arguably not meaningful since the Court recognizes, in the 
same paragraph, that the market in question in Otter Tail was a wholesale 
market87 and no one has ever seriously suggested section 2 does not apply 
to wholesale markets.88  The fact that in both Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail 
the challenged conduct involved the defendant’s discrimination between 
one class of customers (the plaintiff) and another class (purchasers to 
whom sales of the same product were made) may be relevant to establish 
lack of a legitimate business justification.  The Court, however, does not 
say this, but simply leaves unspoken the significance of the discrimination 
present in Aspen Skiing and not alleged in Trinko.89
 
[23]  At the end of its discussion of whether Trinko’s complaint falls 
within the Aspen Skiing exception, the Court notes that Trinko argues that 
“the existence of sharing duties under the 1996 Act supports its case.”90  
This suggests that the Court would undertake a regulatory-context-specific 
antitrust application of Aspen Skiing to the facts alleged by Trinko.  
Instead, the Court declares in conclusory fashion and wholly out of 
context:  “We think the opposite:  The 1996 Act’s extensive provision for 
access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced 
access.”91  This conclusion does not rest easily with the Act’s antitrust 
savings clause.  If Trinko has a section 2 claim, the savings clause 
expressly preserves it,92  and packaging a finding of implied immunity as 
“judicially imposed forced access” does not change the judicial 
nullification of the savings clause. Moreover, this peremptory declaration 
terminates the analysis just where it could instructively begin.93   
 
[24]  In sum, by the end of section 3, relying only on the factual 
distinctions between this case and Aspen Skiing, the Court concludes that 
                                               
86 See generally Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-16. 
87 Id. at 410. 
88 See e.g. Burrough of Landsdale v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 517 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. 
Pa. 1981); Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000); 
In re Pacific Gas & Electric 295 BR 635 (N.Dist. Ca 2003). 
89 See generally Trinko, 540 U.S. 398. 
90 Id. at 411. 
91 Id. 
92 See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
93 See infra Part VI. 
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Verizon’s alleged refusal to deal does not constitute “a recognized 
antitrust claim under this Court’s existing refusal-to-deal precedents.”94  
The section 3 analysis does not follow either the Otter Tail or Town of 
Concord methods.  Although the Court’s analysis is facially similar to the 
Town of Concord method because the first part of its analysis considers 
Trinko’s refusal to deal claim in an unregulated context, as an “ordinary” 
refusal to deal claim, it differs significantly.95  Specifically, it abandons 
the generality of the first part of the Town of Concord method and instead 
inquires whether Trinko is factually on point with Aspen Skiing.96  This 
analytic departure from the Town of Concord method is significant 
because, without explanation, it raises the facts of Aspen Skiing to the 
level of principle.  The Court does this by apparently declaring that unless 
the facts of future refusal-to-deal cases in a regulated or deregulating 
market involve a unilateral termination of a voluntary cooperative scheme 
in a retail market and a sacrifice of short-term profits without a legitimate 
business justification, there will be no section 2 monopolization cause of 
action.97  In other words, the Court effectively held that a section 2 
refusal-to-deal monopolization cause of action will exist only when, as in 
Aspen Skiing, the rivals voluntarily were engaged in a form of joint 
venture which had demonstrable efficiencies (e.g., making available at 
retail a product that otherwise would not exist or making available at retail 
a higher quality product), and one of the parties to that voluntary 
cooperative venture withdraws without any legitimate business 
justification.  But no section 2 cause of action will lie when, as alleged in 
Trinko, a regulatory statute designed to break up retail monopolies and 
promote retail competition places the plaintiff and defendant in a 
compulsory buyer-seller relationship in a wholesale market, and the seller 
refuses to sell its products or services to the buyer in violation of the 
statute even when such a refusal to assist one’s rival thwarts the pro-
competitive ends of the regulatory statute, or when the refusal-to-deal 
allegedly or demonstrably harms economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare.   
 
                                               
94 Id. at 410 (emphasis added). 
 
96 See id. at 409-10. 
97 See id. at 409-11. 
 16
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue1 
[25]  While it is indisputably true that the facts alleged in Trinko do not 
fall within the “existing” or “traditional” refusal-to-deal precedent of 
Aspen Skiing, it hardly follows that Trinko does not fall within or should 
not be analyzed under “existing” or “traditional” refusal-to-deal section 2 
principles or that application of these principles to the context created by 
the Act necessarily requires an “expansion” of the Colgate exception.  The 
Court’s jurisprudential sleight of hand transforms the facts of Aspen Skiing 
into the sole model and standard for all refusal-to-deal cases under section 
2, including regulatory refusal-to-deal cases.  Benjamin Disraeli had it 
right when he stated, “a precedent embalms a principle.”98
 
V. THE REGULATORY SCHEME AND THE EXPANSION OF SECTION 2 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE COLGATE RULE 
 
[26]  The Court engages in an extended analysis of the antitrust 
implications of the Act’s regulatory scheme only in section 4 of the 
majority opinion.99  The Court, implicitly adopting the second part of the 
Town of Concord method, articulates three reasons against creating 
another exception to the rule that there is not a general affirmative duty to 
assist competitors.100   
 
[27]  As in the prior discussion of whether Trinko’s claims fit into the 
Aspen Skiing framework, the Court never addresses the issue of what 
substantive section 2 standard applies to determine whether there is 
section 2 liability for the alleged violations of the Act.101  The Court does 
not consider, for example, whether the “sacrifice test” apparently adopted 
by Aspen Skiing102 should apply to the regulatory scheme created by the 
Act and the facts alleged by Trinko.103  The Court also does not find that 
                                               
98 Benjamin Disraeli, Speech on the Expenditures of the Country (Feb. 22, 1848), in 
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 502 (Emily M. Beck ed., 1980). 
99 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
411-16 (2004). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 409. 
102 Id. at 411-16.  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 
610-11 (1985) (providing that section 2 is violated when the monopolist sacrifices, with 
no legitimate business purpose, short term profits or other business advantage solely to 
obtain a long-term monopoly profit by driving a competitor from the market or creating a 
barrier to entry). 
103 See generally Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-16. 
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Trinko’s complaint fails to allege one or more elements of a section 2 
violation, or that Trinko lacks antitrust standing.104  Instead, adopting the 
generality of the Town of Concord method, the Court considers, (a) 
whether the regulatory framework created by the Act “‘[d]iminishes the 
likelihood of major antitrust harm;’”105 (b) whether the “slight benefits” of 
antitrust intervention outweigh its costs; 106 and (c) the administrative 
difficulties in judicial supervision of the requirement of compulsory access 
under the Act, especially when, as here, the plaintiff seeks injunctive 
relief.107   
 
[28]  Thus, the Court finds no section 2 cause of action because the 
perceived small “likelihood” of “major” antitrust injury, the judicial 
limitations on finding actual antitrust violations and avoiding false 
positives, and the judicial limitations on administering remedies militate 
against an “expansion” of section 2 liability.108  While one might argue 
that it would have been more judicious for the Court to allow discovery to 
proceed to determine whether there was in fact “major” antitrust injury 
and, if so, whether viable remedies could be fashioned, this part of the 
opinion at least takes seriously the regulatory context in which section 2 
would be applied and follows a recognized regulatory antitrust 
methodology. 
 
VI.CONTEXT-SPECIFIC REGULATORY ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
APPLIED TO TRINKO’S COMPLAINT 
 
[29]  Following the Guiding Principle of regulatory antitrust analysis, the 
affirmative duties of cooperation created by the Act and its purpose of 
creating a competitive retail market should have led the Court to undertake 
an inquiry that is the converse of the typical regulatory antitrust inquiry.  
That is, rather than asking what area of competition exists notwithstanding 
the regulatory scheme, the Court should have asked two questions: (1) 
                                               
104 See generally Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-16. 
105 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 
25 (1st Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added) (finding that the Act’s regulatory framework does 
“diminish[ ] the likelihood of major antitrust harm” in certain circumstances). 
106 Id. at 414 (finding that the cost and likelihood of false positives outweigh any benefits 
from “an undue expansion of § 2 liability”). 
107 Id. at 415. 
108 Id. at 412-15 
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what area of competition exists by virtue of the Act, and (2) does 
Verizon’s alleged conduct in or related to that market constitute a 
violation of section 2?  In other words, a context-sensitive antitrust inquiry 
would be informed by the recognition that the antitrust violation in Trinko, 
if any, occurred not because an area of actual competition exists 
notwithstanding the regulatory scheme, as in the typical regulatory 
antitrust analysis, but rather because the Act requires incumbent local 
exchange carriers (“ILECs”) to undertake “cooperative” actions -- namely, 
the compelled participation in a “wholesale market for leasing network 
elements”-- that create necessary conditions for a competitive retail 
market. 109  Significantly, this inquiry does not dictate method; thus, it 
could proceed through either the Otter Tail or Town of Concord method.  
If the Court had adopted the Town of Concord method, the first part of its 
analysis would have focused on issues created by refusal-to-deal claims 
generally in an unregulated market; part two of the analysis may have 
focused on the types of considerations that are raised in section 4 of 
Trinko.110  It is instructive to examine where the analysis may have led 
had the Court adopted the Otter Tail method to address this question. 
 
[30]  Had the Court engaged in a context-sensitive Otter Tail analysis, its 
antitrust analysis may have proceeded in accordance with the following 
sequential steps.  First, the Court would consider that the defendant 
allegedly violated its affirmative duties of cooperation under the Act.111  
Second, the Court would acknowledge that Congress imposed the 
affirmative duties under the Act in order to facilitate retail market entry by 
competitors, to breakup entrenched monopolies by ILECs, and to promote 
retail competition.112 Third, the Court would determine that these goals 
are, at least, not inconsistent with the goals of section 2.  Fourth, under the 
applicable standard for section 2 liability (whatever the Court may have 
determined that to be, either the sacrifice test or some other), 113 the Court 
                                               
109 Id. at 409-10. 
110 Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990). 
111 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403.   
112 Id. at 401, 415. 
113 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 610 (1985).  
Alternatively, it may have selected one of the following standards: whether the 
challenged conduct excludes an equally or more efficient competitor, see RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194-95 (2d ed. 2001); “whether the challenged practice places 
rival competitors at a cost disadvantage sufficient to allow the [monopolist] to exercise 
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would determine whether the alleged violation of affirmative duties of 
cooperation under the Act (a) states a per se (or ipso facto) monopolization 
cause of action under the applicable section 2 standard, (b) creates a 
rebuttable presumption of a violation of the applicable section 2 standard, 
(c)  stands as merely probative evidence of a section 2 violation, or (d) 
none of the above.114  Fifth, and finally, depending on the answers to the 
fourth step, the Court would conclude with a statement of the holding of 
the case.  
 
[31]  Had the Court undertaken this type of Otter Tail analysis, it may 
have concluded, as did the concurring Justices, that Trinko had no 
standing to assert his section 2 claims.115  Trinko alleged that Verizon’s 
antitrust violations occurred in the “wholesale market for leasing network 
elements,” that is, that Verizon was not satisfying its statutory affirmative 
obligations of providing complete and timely access to its network. 116  In 
this compulsory wholesale market, however, Verizon and AT&T stood in 
the relationship of a seller and buyer, respectively.  Generally, a purchaser 
has no section 2 cause of action against its seller in the market in which 
the sale occurs, since the buyer and seller are not competitors in that 
market, and the injury suffered by the buyer and caused by the seller is not 
injury to the competitive process in that market.117  This hornbook rule has 
limits, however, and the Court has found standing when the plaintiff is the 
customer of the defendant’s competitor and the customer’s injuries are 
“[t]he very means by which . . . [the defendant seeks] to achieve its illegal 
                                                                                                                    
monopoly power by raising its price,” see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion:  Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE 
L.J. 209, 214 (1986); whether (1) “the monopolist[’s] [alleged exclusionary conduct] has 
improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it 
enhances monopolist efficiency,” see Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization 
Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 256 (2003); or whether the pro-competitive effects 
outweigh the anticompetitive harms in a section 2 rule of reason balancing test, see 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 44, 76-77 (2001). 
114 See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-77 (1973). 
115 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416-18 (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Thomas, J. concurring). 
116 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 (quoting Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 528, 
574 (2002)). 
117 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 539 (1983); Schuylkill Energy Res. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 
405, 415-17 (3rd Cir. 1997); see also Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
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ends.”118  The Court could have considered whether Verizon’s alleged 
injury to AT&T in the wholesale market was “the very means by which” 
Verizon injured competition between itself and AT&T in the retail market, 
where the two companies were competitors, and hence actionably injured 
Trinko.  That analysis, whatever its conclusion, would at least have 
applied section 2 in a context-sensitive manner.119   
 
[32]  More substantively, had the Court undertaken the Otter Tail analysis 
outlined above or some variant thereon, it would have articulated the 
applicable section 2 standard and discussed how this standard applies to 
the facts alleged and the competitive conditions and retail market created 
by the Act.  Had the Court considered the sacrifice test independent of the 
specific facts of Aspen Skiing, for example, it would have been compelled 
to analyze whether the compulsory cooperation at issue affected Verizon’s 
economic incentives such that the sacrifice test is or is not an appropriate 
standard by which to determine whether its alleged conduct injured 
economic efficiency or consumer welfare.120  The economic presumption 
underlying the sacrifice test is that profit-maximizing conduct, in most 
market circumstances, is economically efficient and promotes consumer 
welfare, such that when a monopolist sacrifices profits in the short-term 
without a legitimate business justification—with no purpose other than to 
drive rivals from the market—then that conduct harms economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare and is exclusionary under section 2.121  A 
regulatory scheme, however, can render inappropriate this presumption 
that profit-maximizing conduct is economically efficient.122  When, as in 
Trinko, compliance with the regulatory scheme involves the sacrifice of 
short-term profits, and when Congress has enacted the scheme to eliminate 
existing monopolies and to promote competition, then violation of the 
                                               
118 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 479 (1982). 
119 Compare this context-sensitive analysis to the three-Justice concurring opinion, which 
finds that Trinko lacked standing, to Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 398-
99 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding through a context-sensitive standing analysis that customers 
of an ILEC’s competitors have standing). 
120 See infra note 125 and accompanying text; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 610-11 (1985) (discussing the “sacrifice” test). 
121 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
122 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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statute may be profit-maximizing and contrary to economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare.123   
 
[33]  This point has been made powerfully by four leading economists in 
their amici brief: 
Strict application of the sacrifice test would gauge the 
profitability of the examined conduct against the 
benchmark of existing price and industry structures:  
interpreted in this way, the local telephone monopolist does 
not incur a “sacrifice” by refusing to grant a competitor 
wholesale access to its network if the price offered by the 
rival generates less profits to the monopolist than selling to 
the rival’s prospective customers at retail (and excluding 
the rival).  The sacrifice test’s illuminative power rests 
legitimately on the presumption that in ordinary market 
conditions, profit-driven conduct that merely preserves 
existing market pricing structures is unobjectionable.  In 
contrast, where, as in the local telephone context, the base-
level pricing structures and refusals to deal have been 
explicitly repudiated as anticompetitive by legislation 
designed to foster competition, such a presumption is 
plainly inappropriate. 
 
. . . . 
 
Where Congress explicitly forbids conduct on the grounds 
that it would prevent the very competition that Congress is 
affirmatively seeking to foster, there is no rational basis to 
presume (as the sacrifice test properly does in other 
contexts) that the current level of profit constitutes the 
appropriate benchmark with which to evaluate the 
incumbent’s strategy for granting access.  In other words, 
in regulated industries, inflexible utilization of a “sacrifice” 
test -- at least as measured against a benchmark of 
monopoly profits resulting from flouting regulations 
designed to foster competition -- is invalid as a matter of 
                                               
123 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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economics, because there can be no legitimate presumption 
that such unimpeded pursuit of profits is not 
anticompetitive and serves the public interest.  Conversely, 
conduct that does not seem to entail a voluntary sacrifice 
may nevertheless constitute willful monopolization because 
the firm’s conduct choices are inconsistent with regulations 
that have been expressly found necessary for protection of 
the public interest. 124
 
On this view, the Act’s provisions mandating cooperation occupy the 
same analytic role as the voluntary cooperative scheme in Aspen Skiing, 
that is, they establish the baseline for presumptively economically efficient 
conduct, departures from which, when challenged, must have a legitimate, 
i.e., not solely exclusionary, business purpose.125   
 
[34]  Had the Court undertaken an Otter Tail analysis, and as part of this 
analysis, considered this view of the analytic role of the compulsory 
affirmative duties of cooperation under the Act, it could then have 
addressed what evidentiary significance, if any, the lower court should 
afford to Verizon’s alleged violation of these duties.  Trinko argued that 
“[c]onduct by an incumbent that violates the Act or obstructs its core 
objectives [of promoting competition] cannot be said to have a ‘legitimate 
business purpose’ -- even when the monopolist might be maximizing its 
short-term profits by sabotaging the competitive entry the 1996 Act seeks 
to enable.”126  Such an approach may be read as urging a per se rule for 
monopolization in this context:  an incumbent monopolist that violates the 
Act is thwarting the pro-competitive goals of the Act and cannot have a 
legitimate business purpose, and hence its violations of the Act are per se 
violations of section 2.127  Most significantly, in view of the Court’s 
                                               
124 Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Respondent, Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, 2003 WL 21767976, at *17, 
*20-21 (No. 02-682) [hereinafter Brief of Economics Professors]. 
125 The discussion in this and the prior paragraph rely heavily on the arguments of the 
Amici Brief of Economics Professors, supra note 124. 
126 Respondent’s Brief, 2003 WL 21767982 at *32.   
127 Compare Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 2003 WL 21269559 at *7 (No. 02-682) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC Brief] (“But 
conduct that violates the obligations imposed by the 1996 Act does not ipso facto violate 
 23
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue1 
framing of the case as a choice between “preserving” or “expanding” 
“traditional antitrust principles,” the Court was not compelled to create 
this new category of antitrust violations.  It might simply have concluded 
that violations of the cooperative duties under the Act create a rebuttable 
presumption or are merely probative of a section 2 violation.128  The Court 
may even have concluded that the violation had no probative value at all, 
on the ground that (a) Trinko did not allege that Verizon’s conduct 
entailed financial sacrifice, and absent a sacrifice of short-term profits that 
makes sense only if it eliminates or impairs competition, section 2 does 
not impose a general duty on a firm to injure itself to benefit a rival,129 or 
(b) the Act imposes affirmative duties that go well beyond what section 2 
requires on its own such that allegations of a violation of the Act tell us 
nothing about whether section 2 was violated.  The Court’s concluding 
remarks strongly suggest that it would favor this latter alternative.130   
                                                                                                                    
the antitrust laws.”), with Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 400 (a violation of the Act does not 
automatically count as exclusionary behavior under section 2).   
128 See Brief of Economics Professors, supra note 124, at *24-*25 (rejecting the 
suggestion that a violation of a competition-enhancing law automatically establishes a 
section 2 violation); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 
F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 2002) (the ILEC’s breach of an interconnection agreement “[m]ay 
in some cases be a means by which the ILEC improperly excludes competition from the 
market.”) (emphasis added), rev’d and remanded by Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); IIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 249 (2d ed. 2002) (“[W]here conduct 
contributes to establishing or maintaining monopoly power, a court will be especially 
likely to find that conduct predatory or anticompetitive if it is also improper for reasons 
extrinsic to the antitrust laws.”) (citing as examples, false advertising, product 
disparagement, the filing of baseless legal proceedings, and the violation of regulatory 
requirements). 
129 This, of course, is the position championed by Verizon and the FTC and DOJ.  See, 
e.g., Petitioner’s Brief, 2003 WL 21244083, at * 21, *26-*27 (treating the sacrifice test as 
an instance of the more general rule that conduct constitutes monopolization only if it 
makes no business sense except for its enabling of monopoly returns from lessened 
competition); DOJ/FTC Brief, supra note 75, at *7, *15-*16, *20; see also 1 ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS ¶ 773, at 211 (5th 
ed. 2002) (“no firm has a general duty to injure itself in order to benefit a rival”). 
130 Section 2 tolerates the existence of monopolies and only condemns monopolization 
and attempted monopolization.  The Act goes further and is intended “to uproo[t] the 
incumbent LEC’s monopoly and to introduce competition in its place.”  Trinko, 540 U.S. 
at 402 (quoting Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 488 (2002)).  The 
Act is “much more ambitious than the antitrust laws [in that it attempts] ‘to eliminate the 
monopolies enjoyed by’ [ILECs, whereas section 2, by contrast,] seeks merely to prevent 
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[35]  In short, the context-sensitive application of “traditional,” “pre-
existing,” or “existing” antitrust principles to the regulatory scheme 
created by the Act does not lead necessarily to an “expansion” of 
exceptions to the Colgate rule, because that application is not sufficient to 
determine an answer to the standing issue, the issue of the evidentiary 
significance, if any, of a monopolist’s violations of the Act, or the issue of 
what substantive section 2 standard is to be applied to determine the 
legality of Verizon’s alleged conduct.  In addition to the standing hurdle 
raised by the facts alleged, the Court might have concluded—after 
analysis of the different goals of the Act and section 2, through adoption 
of the sacrifice test or some other substantive section 2 standard, through a 
rejection of the essential facilities doctrine or the monopoly leveraging 
theory, or for other reasons—that the complaint’s allegations of violations 
of duties of cooperation under the Act did not create antitrust liability 
under section 2.  Yet locked in the grip of its “preserving-versus-
expanding” framework and its elevation of the petrified facts of Aspen 
Skiing to the level of antitrust principles—in a sharp and novel departure 
from the generality of the first part of the Town of Concord method—the 
majority opinion fails to address the challenging questions raised by an 
application of either of the two principal “traditional” and “pre-existing” 




[36]  It is too early to predict whether Trinko’s abandonment of the 
generality of the first part of the Town of Concord method and its 
counterfactual fealty to the facts of one prior refusal-to-deal case represent 
a new method for regulatory antitrust analysis or a case-specific detour.  If 
Trinko’s cementing the facts of Aspen Skiing into antitrust principles is not 
modified in future decisions, then whenever a regulatory scheme places 
rivals in the roles of compulsory seller and purchaser in a wholesale 
market, a viable section 2 refusal-to-deal cause of action is unlikely, either 
                                                                                                                    
unlawful monopolization.”  Id. at 415 (quoting Verizon, 535 U.S. at 476) (emphasis in 
original).  Accordingly, the Sherman Act does not give the judiciary a license to insist 
that monopolists alter their way of doing business “whenever some other approach might 
yield greater competition.”  Id. at 415-16.  In Goldwasser, the Seventh Circuit adopted 
this view after extended analysis.  See 222 F.3d at 400-01.  In contrast, in Trinko, these 
remarks are found in the conclusion of the majority opinion, entirely out of context, and 
without the benefit of any prior supporting argument.  See 540 U.S. at 415-16. 
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for lack of standing or because a requisite section 2 element will be 
deemed to be lacking.  In these circumstances, an incumbent that refuses 
to deal with its competitors apparently will have no antitrust liability even 
when such a refusal to deal contravenes the procompetitive goals of the 
regulatory scheme and even when the regulatory statute contains an 
antitrust savings clause.  If, however, the regulatory scheme requires that 
rivals exchange like goods (e.g. a mandatory patent pool or mandatory 
cross-licensing of intellectual property) or participate in some form of 
joint venture so that the rivals individually or jointly can provide a higher 
quality product or a product that would not otherwise be available to the 
consumer, under Trinko a finding of a viable section 2 cause of action is 
more likely, since this generally describes the facts of Aspen Skiing.  
Moreover, if Aspen Skiing is now the standard for section 2 liability for all 
regulatory refusal-to-deal cases, then it appears that the sacrifice test 
governs all such cases, even when the regulatory scheme may so alter the 
normal economic interests of the monopolist that the application of the test 
may bless conduct that is economically inefficient and harms consumer 
welfare. 
 
[37]  If Trinko’s fealty to the facts of prior antitrust precedent as 
constituting the proper antitrust standard in the ordinary, nonregulatory 
context does represent a new, viable modification of the Town of Concord 
method, that raises a host of unanswered questions, including: 
 
1) what is the justification for this departure from prior 
regulatory antitrust methodology as found in Otter Tail;  
 
2) what are the limitations, if any, of this type of modified 
Town of Concord, or Town of Concord/Trinko, method for 
future regulatory antitrust cases; does it, for example, apply 
only to refusal-to-deal claims, or does it also apply to all 
other types of regulatory antitrust claims, such as price 
squeezes and mergers; and 
 
3) what are the implications of this modified Town of 
Concord method for the application of the Otter Tail and 
Town of Concord methods in future regulatory antitrust 
cases; does Trinko implicitly overrule these methods for all, 
some, or no future cases; if there are now two regulatory 
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antitrust methods recognized by the Court—the Otter Tail 
and the modified Town of Concord methods—then what 
are the principles by which it is determined that one or the 
other should apply—especially critical if in some cases the 
selection of a method may tend to be outcome-
determinative.   
 
[38]  In short, Trinko has introduced additional uncertainty into an area of 
law that is not burdened by an excess of clear and sharp rules.  Business 
conduct and planning, and antitrust counseling, have thus taken on an 
additional layer of uncertainty and complexity. 
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